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Rumsfeld and the
Retired Generals
Author: Samuel Metz
Date: 4/17/06
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When Donald Rumsfeld entered the office
of Secretary of Defense, he had a clear agenda. He envisioned an
extremely mobile military capable of defeating enemy forces with high
efficiency. He proposed that our most valuable asset was technology on
the battlefield, which would spare lives, time, and cost. He wanted an
Army capable of cleanly defeating any enemy at any time. And he worked
hard, frequently against entrenched military resistance, to make this
vision a reality. Clearly in doing so, he generated considerable
opposition amongst his generals. Now the generals are speaking
out.
Is this good for the United
States?
The question is complicated. First, none
of the retired generals speaking out discuss Mr. Rumsfeld’s
long-standing attempt to coax military strategists from what the Army
calls "Tipfid." This acronym TPPFDD stands for
"Time-phased Force and Deployment Data." Translated from
military jargon, this represents a strategy of methodical, careful, and
sure preparation before engagement. What this means to Rumsfeld is
delay, stall, and loss of initiative.
Instead, the generals address the
specific processes of how Mr. Rumsfeld entered the war in Iraq and how
he conducted it after a military victory was declared. Even if we
attribute to the generals subliminal resentment at Mr. Rumsfeld’s
strategic revisions which long predate the Iraq war, their objections
are valid on their own terms.
Second, it is difficult to weigh the
spoken opinions of six retired generals versus the unspoken opinions of
several thousand other retired generals. In statistical terms, we lack a
denominator. If these six are the only ones who find Rumsfeld’s
conduct objectionable while thousands of others do not, the impact of
these objections is reduced. And what do the active generals, currently
running the war in Iraq, think of our Defense Secretary?
It is notable that while several
high-ranking generals have questioned the appropriateness of generals
criticizing civilians, General Peter Pace, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, remains the only active General to dispute the content of the
objections. No active duty general has supported the objections, but we
would be surprised if that happened. Criticizing one’s superiors
publicly is tantamount to insubordination for active officers. Their
silence should not be over-interpreted.
Among other retired generals, only Gen.
Michael DeLong, deputy to Gen. Tommy Franks during the invasion, came to
the defense of Mr. Rumsfeld. Of note, he did not dispute that Mr.
Rumsfeld made decisions contrary to the recommendations of high-ranking
Army officers; he made the point that Mr. Rumsfeld at least listened to
the officers first.
Given the professional constraints among
our military against public criticism, we ought to give considerable
credibility to the objections of these retired generals who dared to
speak out.
Third, is it at all appropriate for
military leaders to go public with criticism of civilian leaders? The
issue has powerful implications. Is there a difference between retired
generals publicly criticizing the Secretary of Defense for the conduct
of war and active generals criticizing the President for the conduct of
domestic policies? If not, then we open our country to the possibility
that our military will become a domestic political force, much like our
major political parties. The difference is that our major political
parties do not have millions of armed service people trained to obey
orders without question stationed at bases across the entire country. A
military coup d’etat has never happened in this country. But crossing
this line brings us one step closer.
But there is a difference between
retired military personnel and active personnel. Retired generals do not
command troops or hold positions of official influence nor do they speak
for anyone else within the active Army. Their opinions, like any those
of any citizen, are their own. What sets their opinions apart from the
average civilian speaking out on the conduct of war is that retired
military may have first hand experience, experience not available to
civilians.
Additionally, it is inappropriate to
insist on a cult of infallibility among our military leaders. Like
anyone making life and death decisions, our leaders, both military and
civilian make errors. It is the responsibility of the organization to
detect, analyze, and correct errors, be they personal errors or flaws in
the system. If critical errors go unaddressed, especially those
endangering lives, it is essential that someone point that out.
And it is appropriate that active duty
military leaders let retired leaders assume that unpleasant task. These
retired generals perform a thankless but critical function. It is also
essential that they restrict their comments to matters of specific
military import, which they have done so far. While it is tempting to
interpret any criticism of Secretary Rumsfeld as a non-specific attack
on the entire beleaguered Bush administration, the generals have,
apparently with great care, kept their comments to specific aspects of
Mr. Rumsfeld’s management of the war. For this they deserve credit.
Taking all the issues together, we can
make some conclusions.
1. The objections of the six retired
generals should be given considerable weight. We do not know how many
other retired general agree with them, but their comments have value
even without outside corroboration.
2. It is appropriate that retired rather
than active generals speak on issues that concern the leadership of our
military. It is also appropriate that civilian listeners independently
determine the validity of their objections, just as we should with
anyone denouncing our civilian leaders.
3. The fact that no active duty general
has voiced public support should be taken as respect for the chain of
command from civilian directors, not as tacit agreement or objection. We
expect our military to carry out the orders of our civilian leaders,
whether they agree or not, and then voice any objections privately.
4. And Mr. Rumsfeld should absolutely
not resign, nor should President Bush ask for it. We come too close to
reversing our traditional civilian control over military to allow
generals, even if retired, to dictate which civilians run our Defense
Department.
Instead, Secretary Rumsfeld and
President should pay close attention to absolutely every comment from
these generals, and others. If we are to correct the errors that led us
into Iraq and keep us there long after an apparent military victory, we
must weigh opinions from all directions.
Especially from the generals who have
been there.
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